From the start of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, both sides attacked each other’s oil production and export facilities. By the end of the six-day trip, Carter managed to secure Begin and Sadat’s agreement on a peace treaty, which was signed at the White House on March 26, 1979. The administration of President George W. Bush had multiple rationales for invading Iraq in 2003, some of which were strategically sensible, while others were not. Foreign-policy advisers within the Carter administration speculated that the Soviet Union wished to prevent the spread of the Islamic Revolution (1978–79) that had erupted in Iran and that threatened to engulf the neighbouring Soviet republics. Consider how little attention the cancellation in August of what would have been Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s fourth trip to Pyongyang garnered. Our policy is derived from willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our The attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais and the lack of U.S. response sent the message to Iran and Washington’s Gulf allies that the United States is no longer interested in upholding the rules of conduct it once established and formerly enforced in the region. Have a question about our comment policies?
For the Saudis, it was much too little, much too late, and only emphasized Trump’s unwillingness to confront Iran directly. between Israel and Egypt, which paved the way for new progress in the Middle One of the many problems with the contradictions in Trump’s policy is how they have scrambled the concerns of other knowledgeable Americans. Although few Americans want a war with Iran and many were relieved when Trump did nothing, the combination of his belligerence and indolence have created a real danger of escalation. way back to our own principles and values, and we have regained our lost Steven A. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. It was a response to the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, and it was intended to deter the Soviet Union, the United States' Cold War adversary, from seeking hegemony in the Persian Gulf region. In an age of intensifying challenges to American power, allies—and adversaries—are paying close attention to which commitments the United States is or is not willing to maintain. More ominously still, Saudi Arabia, which was formerly not a serious candidate to acquire nuclear weapons, is now the poster child for that problem. The U.S. objective vis-à-vis Iraq gradually shifted to regime change, with the decisive break coming after 9/11. Moreover, the U.S. would have to strike hard enough to demonstrate both to Iran and to the world that it will not back down from a fight, and that if Iran chooses to escalate, so too will America. In 1987, Iran expanded the conflict, targeting the oil exports of the GCC states for supporting Iraq. water. Critics of that commitment have offered multiple arguments for why Washington ought to pull back from the region. By withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal and imposing “maximum pressure” on Tehran economically, Trump provoked the Iranians to begin attacking the Gulf states and their oil exports. Sending several thousand American troops to beef up Saudi air defenses (as the Trump administration did this fall) was better than nothing, but not by much. “To a degree not seen in earlier presidents, Trump seems to define his progress chiefly in whether he likes foreign leaders he meets — and they him,” the Los Angeles Times observed last year. They have always believed that Washington was determined to destroy the Iranian regime, and it was the United States’ alliance with the GCC states that brought U.S. military forces into the region to do so. He committed U.S. forces and built an international coalition to fight the Islamic State in part because it threatened to spread beyond its Syrian and Iraqi origins and destabilize the oil-rich region. Through the GCC’s prism, the reluctance to take on Iran is the most recent (and most significant) sign of U.S. incompetence and unreliability—a parade of errors that includes the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the failure to support Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, and the unwillingness to intervene in Syria from 2011 to 2015, all of which accrued to Iran’s benefit. years of U.S. political and military support to one of Latin America’s most Initially, the diplomatic initiatives of President Carter and Secretary Vance Avoiding the appearance of failure risked becoming more important than achieving success. But presidential involvement also attracts domestic actors — interest groups, Congress and especially the media — that can further politicize foreign policy.

This is why the United States cared about Persian Gulf stability even when it was a net oil exporter in the early 20th century. Each is founded in realities that should refine U.S. strategy toward the Gulf, but not abandon it, as Trump appears to be doing. On the eve of renewed sanctions by Washington, Iranian protesters demonstrate outside the former U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Nov. 4, 2018. Carter’s successor, U.S. President Ronald Reagan, built on this strategy with what should be seen as a “Reagan Corollary,” which committed Washington to defending the free export of Gulf oil against threats from within the Middle East as well. And by doing so, he undercut the central premise of U.S. strategy in the Persian Gulf. Thus, he weakened the only Iranian faction that might have been willing to negotiate a new nuclear deal. Indeed, Trump’s desertion of the Carter Doctrine is making it more likely that Tehran will achieve its greatest strategic victory since the Islamic Revolution—a victory that is still very much in the United States’ interest to deny. A destroyed installation after an attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq oil processing plant is seen on Sept. 20. By signing up you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy, Daniel Strieff is a visiting research fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science and author of ", Discussion of news topics with a point of view, including narratives by individuals regarding their own experiences, Share your feedback by emailing the author. The Iranians increasingly seem to believe that they can strike with relative impunity because Trump is afraid of a war with them—and they will have every reason to keep striking as long as the United States continues squeezing the Iranian economy. Most U.S. allies and key security partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific still depend on Gulf oil.